North Dakota Law Review
Volume 81
Number 2 Number 2

Article 7

January 2005

Constitutional Law - Search and Seizure: The North Dakota
Supreme Court Considers Whether an Officer May Search a NonArrested Person's Purse Incident to the Arrest of Another Person
in the Same Vehicle - State v. Tognotti
Kirsten M. Sjue

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Sjue, Kirsten M. (2005) "Constitutional Law - Search and Seizure: The North Dakota Supreme Court
Considers Whether an Officer May Search a Non-Arrested Person's Purse Incident to the Arrest of Another
Person in the Same Vehicle - State v. Tognotti," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 81 : No. 2 , Article 7.
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol81/iss2/7

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons.
For more information, please contact zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT CONSIDERS
WHETHER AN OFFICER MAY SEARCH A NON-ARRESTED
PERSON'S PURSE INCIDENT TO THE ARREST OF
ANOTHER PERSON IN THE SAME VEHICLE
State v. Tognotti, 2003 ND 99, 663 N.W.2d 642

I.

FACTS

At about 10:15 p.m. on April 24, 2002, Officer Todd Wahl of the Fargo
Police Department stopped a vehicle for driving without headlights after
dark.' Jessica Tognotti was the driver of the vehicle. 2 Tognotti's husband,
young daughter, and friend, Wendell Decoteau, were all passengers in the
car at the time of the stop. 3 Officer Wahl requested Tognotti's driver's
license, registration, and insurance information. 4 He asked Tognotti's husband and Decoteau to produce identification as well. 5
When Officer Wahl ran a routine check for outstanding arrest warrants,
he learned that a warrant had been issued for Decoteau's arrest for failure to
pay child support. 6 Officer Wahl arrested Decoteau, and then asked
Tognotti and her husband to step out of the vehicle so he could search the
passenger compartment incident to the arrest. 7 While searching the car, he

searched Tognotti's purse, "which was lying on the driver's side of the front
seat." 8 Officer Wahl found a sunglasses case in her purse that contained
1. State v. Tognotti, 2003 ND 99, 1 3, 663 N.W.2d 642, 643. In North Dakota, driving a
vehicle without headlights at night is a non-criminal traffic violation. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 3906.1-05, 39-21-01 (2003). A person who commits the offense may be fined but cannot receive
any jail time. Id. § 39-06.1-05.
2. Tognotti, 3, 663 N.W.2d at 643.
3. Id.
4. Appellee's Brief at 3, State v. Tognotti, 2003 ND 99,663 N.W.2d 642 (No. 20030015).
5. Id.
6. Tognotti, 5 3, 663 N.W.2d at 643-44.
7. Id. at 644.
8. Id. Before the suppression hearing in district court, the parties stipulated that the record of
facts was to come from Officer Wahl's report and Tognotti's affidavit in support of the motion to
suppress. Appellant's Brief at 2, State v. Tognotti, 2003 ND 99, 663 N.W.2d 642 (No.
20030015). Neither the report nor the affidavit contained any information regarding whether the
officer directed Tognotti to leave her purse in the vehicle. Id. However, in its order to suppress,
the district court made a finding of fact that "Ms. Tognotti left her purse on the driver's seat, at the
officer's direction." Id. On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, the parties disagreed over
whether the district court correctly found this fact. Compare id. with Appellee's Brief at 5,
Tognotti (No. 20030015). In its brief, the State claimed that there was no basis for the district
court's finding in the facts agreed to by the parties. Appellant's Brief at 2, Tognotti (No.
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various items of drug paraphernalia, "including a syringe, a spoon, three
ends of what appeared to be a tied baggie, and a small amount of what
appeared to be methamphetamine residue." 9 Tognotti was then arrested and
charged with a Class C felony, possession of drug paraphernalia.10
Before trial, Tognotti filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained
through the search of her purse," claiming the search was unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.1 2 On
December 11, 2002, the District Court of Cass County granted Tognotti's
motion and suppressed the items of drug paraphernalia that Officer Wahl
had discovered in her purse.13 The district court reasoned that the search of
the vehicle incident to the arrest of the driver should not have included
Tognotti's purse because Tognotti was a non-arrested occupant of the
vehicle.14 The State appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court, which

reversed the district court's ruling and found that searching Tognotti's purse
incident to the arrest of the driver would be permissible if Tognotti volun5
tarily left the purse in the vehicle.'
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."16

20030015). However, Tognotti argued the finding was correct because she offered several times
to testify at trial that "the officer told her to leave [the] purse in the car." Appellee's Brief at 3,
Tognotti (No. 20030015). Ultimately, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that there was no
factual basis for the finding, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Officer Wahl instructed Tognotti to leave her purse in the vehicle. Tognotti, 5 22, 663 N.W.2d at 650.
9. Tognotti, T 3, 663 N.W.2d at 644.
10. Id. The North Dakota Century Code defines the offense of unlawful possession of drug
paraphernalia as:
A person may not use or possess with intent to use drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process,
prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or
otherwise introduce into the human body a controlled substance in violation of chapter
19-03.1. Any person violating this section is guilty of a class C felony if the drug
paraphernalia is used, or possessed with intent to be used, to manufacture, compound,
convert, produce, process, prepare, test, inject, ingest, inhale, or analyze a controlled
substance, other than marijuana, classified in schedule I, 11, or Ill of chapter 19-03.1.
Otherwise, a violation of this section is a class A misdemeanor.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.4-03 (2003).
11. Appellant's Brief at 2, Tognotti (No. 20030015).
12. Tognotti, 4, 663 N.W.2d at 644.
13. Appellant's Brief at 2, Tognotti (No. 20030015).
14. Tognotti, T 4, 663 N.W.2d at 644. The district court based its ruling on a previous
decision of the North Dakota Supreme Court, State v. Gilberts, 497 N.W.2d 93 (1993). Id.
15. Id. 55 21-22, 663 N.W.2d at 650.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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As a general rule, the United States Supreme Court has expressed a preference for searches conducted under a search warrant issued by a neutral
and detached magistrate and supported by probable cause. 17 However, the
Court has also recognized a number of exceptions to the warrant requirement, allowing warrantless searches in certain circumstances. 18 One of
these recognized exceptions is a search incident to a lawful arrest. 19 At this
point, a basic overview of the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence
regarding search incident to lawful arrest, as well as an examination of one
crucial North Dakota Supreme Court decision on the issue, will be helpful.
A.

DEVELOPMENT OF SEARCH INCIDENT TO LAWFUL ARREST AS AN
EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT

Prior to 1969, the United States Supreme Court decisions involving the
permissible scope of a search incident to arrest lacked a coherent guiding
principle.2 0 The Court's decision in Chimel v. California21 marked a turning point in Fourth Amendment law governing searches incident to arrest. 22
Twelve years later, New York v. Belton23 set forth a new bright-line rule for
searches incident to the arrest of an occupant of a vehicle. 24

17. E.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (stating that the warrant
process is preferred because a neutral judge reviews law enforcement action). The language of the
Fourth Amendment reads, "[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." U.S. CONST. amend IV. Justice Jackson famously stated,
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is
not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable
men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13-14.
18. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985) (recognizing an automobile
exception to the search warrant requirement); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219
(1973) (recognizing an exception to the search warrant requirement when the person subject to the
search has given valid consent).
19. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755-56 (1969) (recognizing an exception
for searches incident to arrest); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (recognizing a special exception for searching the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to the arrest of an
occupant).
20. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755 (1969). See also 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH
& SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 299-300 (3d ed., West Publishing Co.
1996) (1978) (summarizing pre-Chimel United States Supreme Court decisions concerning the
permissible scope of a search incident to arrest).
21. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
22. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768.
23. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
24. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:377

1. PermissibleScope of a Search Incident to Arrest Pre-Chimel
By the United States Supreme Court's own admission, the law governing the permissible scope of searches incident to arrest was, at best, unclear
in the thirty-five years prior to Chimel.25 The Court first mentioned search
incident to arrest in dictum in Weeks v. United States,26 approving the right
to "search the person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and
seize the fruits or evidences of crime."2 7 Eleven years later, the Court's
dictum in Carroll v. United States28 extended the proper scope of a search
incident to arrest to "whatever is found upon [the arrestee's] person or in his
control." 2 9 Just a few months after Carroll, the Court again extended the
scope language in Agnello v. United States, 30 to include both the person of
the arrestee and the place where the arrest occurred. 31
Beginning with the 1927 decision of Marron v. United States,32 the
Court's jurisprudence in this area became even more unpredictable. 33 In
Marron, federal agents arrested the manager of an establishment selling
alcoholic beverages and then searched the premises beyond the scope of the
search warrant. 34 The Court upheld the search, finding that the arrest on the
premises gave the agents the right to conduct a warrantless search of "all
35
parts of the premises used for the unlawful purpose."
Several years later, the Court seemed to change its approach in Go-Bart
Importing Company v. United States.36 In that case, federal agents arrested
several people in an office and then searched the entire office, including a
locked safe. 37 The Court found the search unlawful, emphasizing that the
result differed from Marron because the agents in this case did not procure

25. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 755. Justice Stewart, writing for the Chimel majority, observed that
the Court's decisions in this area "have been far from consistent, as even the most cursory review
makes evident." Id. See also LAFAVE, supra note 20, at 299 (stating that the first thirty-five years
of United States Supreme Court cases on search incident to arrest involved many "twists and
turns").

26. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
27. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392.
28. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
29. Carroll,267 U.S. at 158.
30. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
31. Agnello, 269 U.S. at 30.
32. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
33. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 756-59 (1969) (summarizing the United States
Supreme Court's pre-Chimel search incident to arrest decisions).
34. Marron, 275 U.S. at 193-94.
35. Id. at 199.
36. 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
37. Go-BartImp. Co., 282 U.S. at 349-50.
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a warrant even though they had time to do s0. 38 Likewise, in United States
v. Lefkowitz, 39 law enforcement officers searched the desk drawers and a

cabinet in the room where an arrest occurred, and the Court determined the
scope of the search violated the Fourth Amendment. 40
In 1947, the Court in Harris v. United States4' seemed to completely
ignore Marron and Lefkowitz, approving the search of a person's entire
four-bedroom apartment incident to his arrest inside it.42 However, just one
year later in Trupiano v. United States,43 the Court found that federal agents
had unreasonably searched the premises of a distillery after arresting its
operators on site.4 The Trupiano majority found that the arrests alone were
not enough to justify the search of the entire premises and held the search
was unreasonable because the agents had time to obtain a search warrant
but failed to do so.45
In 1950, the Supreme Court rejected Trupiano in United States v.
Rabinowitz46 and held that a search warrant is not required just because it
may be practicable to obtain; rather, the inquiry is whether the search incident to arrest was reasonable under all the circumstances. 47 The Rabinowitz
majority upheld an hour-long search of the arrestee's office, including his
desk, safe, and file cabinets, incident to his arrest there. 4 8 The Court
affirmed the continuing vitality of Harris,49 and approved the principle that
an arrest gives law enforcement the right "to search the place where the
arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as
its fruits or as the means by which it was committed .... "50
After 1950, the United States Supreme Court applied the HarrisRabinowitz rule to cases involving searches incident to arrest.5 1

38. Id.at 358. Professor LaFave notes that the Go-Bart majority distinguished Marron on
two additional grounds: (1) the agents in Marronhad a search warrant, and (2) the saloon manager
there committed a crime in the agents' presence. LAFAVE, supra note 20, at 299-300.
39. 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
40. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. at 458-59, 467.
41. 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
42. Harris, 331 U.S. at 149-51.
43. 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
44. Trupiano, 334 U.S. at 702-03.
45. Id. at 705, 708.
46. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
47. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 66.
48. Id.at 59.
49. Id.at 63.
50. Id.at 61 (quoting Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925)).
51. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 760 n.4 (1969) (stating that the Court had
applied the "abstract doctrine" of Rabinowitz to subsequent cases); see also Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23, 41-42 (1963) (citing to Harris and Rabinowitz); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217,
235-36 (1960) (explaining the applicability of the Harris-Rabinowitz rule).
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Significantly, the Harris-Rabinowitzrule imposed minimal limitations on
the search incident to arrest exception; it seemed to allow a search of the
entire premises where a person was arrested. 52 The Court did limit the
scope of the search somewhat, at least as to duration and intensity, based on
the type of items law enforcement was seeking during the search. 53 But in
cases where law enforcement arrested a vehicle occupant, HarrisRabinowitz generally allowed a full search of the vehicle, including the
trunk.5 4 After almost two decades of purporting to adopt and apply the
Harris-Rabinowitzrule, the Court ultimately rejected it in Chimel, finding
that it could "withstand neither historical nor rational analysis."55
2.

PermissibleScope of a Search Incident to Arrest Under
Chimel v. California

In 1969, the United States Supreme Court dramatically changed its
approach to searches incident to arrest in Chimel.56 In that case, three law

enforcement officers obtained a warrant to arrest Chimel for the burglary of
a local coin shop. 57 When the officers went to Chimel's home to arrest him,
he was not there. 58 However, Chimel's wife allowed the officers to wait in
the house, and Chimel arrived about ten to fifteen minutes later. 59 After
showing him the arrest warrant, the officers sought consent to search the
house, which Chimel refused. 60 The officers told Chimel that they were
allowed to search the house anyway as a result of his arrest and then
searched the entire house, "including the attic, the garage, and a small
workshop." 61 The officers seized various coins and other objects during the

52. See Abel, 362 U.S. at 235 (stating "Harrisand Rabinowitz set by far the most permissive
limits upon searches incidental to lawful arrests"). See also LAFAVE, supra note 20, at 300
(explaining the impact of the Harris-Rabinowitzrule).
53. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1947) (stating that the type of
thorough search required to find two canceled checks would not be reasonable to find a stolen car
or an illegal still).
54. See LAFAVE, supra note 20, at 433 (explaining the manner in which courts applied the
Harris-Rabinowitz rule).
55. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 760. In Chimel, Justice Stewart noted that even the United States
Supreme Court had difficulty applying the "abstract" Harris-Rabinowitzdoctrine, and its cases
under the rule produced "divergent results." Id. at n.4. LaFave argues that the Court's abandonment of the Harris-Rabinowitz rule was proper because it was never supported by a convincing
rationale. LAFAVE, supra note 20, at 302.
56. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768.
57. Id. at 753.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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course of the search. 62 The United States Supreme Court found that the
officers had exceeded the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest,
making the search unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 63
In reaching its decision, the Chimel majority focused on two primary
justifications for allowing a search incident to arrest under the Fourth
Amendment: officer safety and preservation of evidence.64 In terms of
safety, the Court stated that it would be reasonable for an officer to search
the arrested person for weapons. 65 Likewise, an officer could reasonably
search the arrested person for evidence to prevent its destruction. 66 Moving
beyond the search of the person, the Court then reasoned that any weapons
or evidence in the surrounding area within the reach of the arrestee would
be a danger as well. 67 Based on this logic, the Court determined that the
permissible scope of a search incident to arrest extended to "a search of the
arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control'-construing
that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of
a weapon or destructible evidence." 68
Applying this rule to the facts of the case, the majority determined that
the search of Chimel's entire house incident to his arrest was unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. 69 The extensive search did not serve the
underlying purposes of a search incident to arrest because Chimel could not
have had access to the weapons or evidence in his entire house. 70 The
Court concluded that "[t]here was no constitutional justification, in the
absence of a search warrant, for extending the search beyond that area" of
Chimel's immediate control.7 1
Although the facts of Chimel involved the search of an arrestee's
residence incident to arrest, Chimel's rationale was still clearly applicable to

62. Id.
63. Id. at 768. At trial, Chimel claimed that the items taken during the search were obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 754. The state trial court found that the evidence
was admissible, and Chimel was convicted of two burglary charges. Id. His conviction was affirmed twice on appeal before reaching the United States Supreme Court. Id.; People v. Chimel,
439 P.2d 333, 334 (1968).
64. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969); see also LAFAVE, supra note 20, at
433-34 (explaining the Chimel Court's rationale).
65. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. The United States Supreme Court expressly overruled its previous decisions in Harris
v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), and United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), to the
extent that the two decisions were inconsistent with the principles of Chimel. Id. at 768.
69. Id. at 768.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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vehicle searches incident to arrest. 72 However, some lower courts resisted
applying Chimel's principles to vehicle searches, and in those courts that
attempted to apply Chimel, the results were anything but uniform. 73
Ultimately, Chimel's "immediate control" language became far less important in the context of vehicle searches, when the Court announced a new
rule for searches incident to the lawful custodial arrest of a vehicle occupant
in New York v. Belton.74
3.

Creationof a Bright-Line Rule for Search Incident to the
Arrest of a Vehicle Occupant Under New York v. Belton

In Belton, decided twelve years after Chimel, the United States
Supreme Court further defined the permissible scope of a search incident to
arrest in the specific context of vehicle searches. 75 In that case, a police
officer pulled over a speeding vehicle on the highway; four people were in
the vehicle, including Belton. 76 When he approached the car to obtain
driver's license and registration information, the officer noticed the smell of
burning marijuana and saw an envelope labeled "Supergold," which he
knew related to marijuana use. 77 The officer arrested and searched all four
men incident to arrest, including Belton, and then began searching the
passenger compartment of the vehicle. 78 He also searched Belton's jacket,
which had been left in the car, and found cocaine in one of the pockets. 79
After being charged with criminal drug possession, Belton moved to
suppress the cocaine, which he claimed was obtained through an unreasonable search. 80 The United States Supreme Court held that the officer had
the right to search Belton's jacket during the search of the vehicle incident
to arrest. 81
72. LAFAVE, supra note 20, at 434. In reaching this conclusion, LaFave observes the Chimel
Court's reference to Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964), which involved a vehicle
search. Id.
73. Id. at 434-35.
74. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,460 (1981).
75. Belton, 453 U.S. at 455.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 455-56.
78. Id. at 456.
79. Id.
80. Id. The trial court ruled that the cocaine was admissible, and Belton plead guilty,
reserving the right to appeal the suppression issue. Id. Belton's first appeal to the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court was unsuccessful. People v. Belton, 416 N.Y.S.2d 922, 925
(N.Y. App. Div. 1979). On his second appeal, the New York Court of Appeals reversed, finding
that the search of Belton's jacket was unreasonable, and suppressed the cocaine. People v. Belton,
407 N.E.2d 420, 423 (N.Y. 1980). His second appeal also generated a strong dissent. Id. at 423.
81. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981). Belton was a 5-4 decision, with
Justice Stewart writing the majority opinion for the Court. Id. at 455.
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In reaching its decision, the Court relied heavily on the notion that
Chimel did not create a straightforward rule for determining the proper
scope of vehicle searches incident to arrest. 82 The majority reasoned that
"[a] single familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have
83
only limited time and expertise" to assess the circumstances around them.
Evaluating the lower court decisions on the issue, the Court determined that
the Chimel "immediate control" test was too difficult to apply on a case-bycase basis in vehicle situations. 84
In response to this perceived difficulty, the Belton majority decided a
new bright-line rule to govern searches incident to the arrest of a vehicle
occupant. 85 In formulating this rule, the Court worked from the assumption
that any items inside the passenger compartment of a vehicle "are in fact
generally, even if not inevitably, within 'the area into which an arrestee
might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary [item]."' 86 Under the
Court's reasoning, this generalization brought the entire passenger compartment of the vehicle within the proper limits of Chimel, while still providing
a workable rule for law enforcement. 87
In Belton, the Court announced its new bright-line rule. 88 When an
officer makes a lawful custodial arrest of a vehicle occupant, the officer can
89
search the passenger compartment of that vehicle incident to the arrest.

However, the Court explicitly excluded the trunk of the vehicle from the
permissible scope of the search.90 In addition, the officer would be allowed

82. Id. at 460.
83. Id. at 458 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979)).
84. Id. at 459. LaFave argues that the Belton majority overstated the difficulty of applying
Chimel to vehicle searches, and that "the Chimel rationale is in many respects easier in automobile
cases than in in-premises cases because the police can, and typically do, immediately remove the
arrestee from the vehicle." LAFAVE, supra note 20, at 455. After the arrested person is out of the
vehicle, it should be easier to control his access to weapons or evidence. Id. He concludes that
any disarray in the lower courts "has been more a product of the police seeing how much they
could get away with... than their being confronted with inherently ambiguous situations." Id.
85. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
86. Id. (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).
87. Id.
88. Id. The Belton majority emphasized that its holding did not change the "fundamental
principles" of Chimel, but rather just "determinel the meaning of Chimel's principles in this
particular and problematic context." Id. at n.2.
89. Id. at 460. The United States Supreme Court recently refined the meaning of a vehicle
"occupant" under Belton's bright-line rule in Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 617 (2004).
In Thornton, the suspect, who had been driving when he first saw the police officer, parked and
exited his vehicle before the officer could stop him. Id. The Court held that Thornton was a
"recent" occupant of a vehicle, and therefore, the officer could search his vehicle incident to the
arrest. Id. at 620-23.
90. Belton, 453 U.S. at 461 n.4. Justice Brennan's dissent in Belton points out that in some
vehicles the trunk area may be reached through the passenger compartment, such as a station
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to search any open or closed containers found in the passenger compartment. 91 The Court noted that the term "container" meant "any object
capable of holding another object," including the glove compartment,
boxes, bags, and clothing. 92 Because the right to search any containers in
the passenger compartment is justified by the arrest alone, the probability of
finding weapons or evidence in a particular container is irrelevant. 93
Turning to the facts of the case, the majority determined that the search
of Belton's jacket was reasonable under its newly announced bright-line
rule.94 Belton was a passenger in a vehicle at the time of his arrest,95 so the
search incident to arrest could extend to the entire passenger compartment
of the vehicle, including any containers. 96 Belton's jacket was a "container"
within the passenger compartment; therefore, the officer rightfully searched
it incident to his arrest. 97
Since the decision came down in 1981, Belton has had its share of
critics. 98 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan argued that the Court
was adopting a legal fiction to support its bright-line rule because the entire
passenger compartment is not always within the reach of the arrestee. 99
Another criticism is that Belton's bright-line rule leaves many unanswered
questions, and that Chimel's "immediate control" test is actually easier to
apply.lOO Finally, it has been argued that the Belton bright-line rule has the
wagon. Id. at 470 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority does not discuss how the Belton brightline rule should be applied in such a case. Id.
91. Id. at 460-61.
92. Id. at 461 n.4.
93. Id. See also LAFAVE, supra note 20, at 452-53 (stating that the Belton majority's
emphasis on a bright-line approach "strongly suggests the Court did not want to compel the police
to make case-by-case judgments as to where weapons or evidence might be located.").
94. Belton, 453 U.S. at 462-63.
95. Id. at 462. Belton did not challenge the lawfulness of the custodial arrest. Id. at 460 n.2.
96. Id. at 460-61.
97. Id. at 462-63.
98. See id. at 464-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing Belton fails to reflect the policy
justifications for a search incident to arrest offered in Chimel); id. at 472 (White, J.,dissenting)
(objecting to the search of containers in the vehicle without any particularized suspicion). Five of
the current United States Supreme Court justices recently criticized Belton in Thornton v. United
States, 541 U.S. 615, 624-36 (2004). In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor expressed dissatisfaction with Belton and its "shaky foundation." Id. at 624 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice
Scalia's concurrence stated that the Court's jurisprudence in this area is not logically consistent,
because "Belton cannot reasonably be explained as a mere application of Chimel." Id. at 631
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens and Souter argued that Belton is wrongfully being applied
to cases beyond its bright-line. Id. at 640 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99. Belton, 453 U.S. at 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also LAFAVE, supra note 20, at
455 (agreeing that there are many cases in which an arrestee could not reach the interior of the
vehicle, such as when he is moved to a patrol car, handcuffed, or restrained by an officer).
100. Belton, 453 U.S. at 469-71 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Professor LaFave agrees that
Belton's rule leaves unanswered questions on some critical issues, but also claims that it is "not as
ambiguous as the dissenters in that case assert." LAFAVE, supra note 20, at 454.
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potential to be abused by law enforcement, as officers now have an incentive to make arrests they otherwise would not in order to perform a
search. 101

In light of these criticisms, some state courts have declined to apply
Belton under their state constitutions, choosing instead to apply the more
restrictive test of Chimel to determine the permissible scope of a vehicle
search incident to arrest. 102 The North Dakota Supreme Court, however,
has embraced the Belton bright-line rule and continues to apply it in cases
involving the arrest of a vehicle occupant. 103
B.

THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT CONSIDERS THE
APPLICABILITY OF BELTON TO NON-ARRESTED VEHICLE

OCCUPANTS

In State v. Gilberts,l0 4 the North Dakota Supreme Court was presented
with the question of whether the Belton bright-line rule allows an officer to
search an item in the passenger compartment belonging to a non-arrested
vehicle occupant incident to the arrest of another person in that vehicle. 0 5
In that case, Gilberts was the front-seat passenger in a car that was stopped
for speeding on the highway.10 6 The officer arrested the driver after discovering that he had a suspended driver's license. 07 The officer placed the
driver in his patrol vehicle and then asked Gilberts to get out of the car so
he could search it incident to the arrest. 108 When Gilberts exited the car, the
officer noticed a jacket that had been draped around Gilberts' shoulders was
left inside and offered it to him because the weather was cold.109 Gilberts
told the officer that it was his jacket."10 When the officer handed it to
Gilberts, he noticed a large amount of cash in one of the pockets."', The
officer removed the cash and a small box from the pocket. 112 Inside the

101. LAFAVE, supra note 20, at 457.
102. Id. at 436 n.24. States that have rejected Belton under their state constitutions or
statutes include Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
and Washington. Id.
103. E.g., State v. Haverluk, 2000 ND 178, 5 8, 617 N.W.2d 652, 655 (stating that the Court
applies the Belton rule to searches incident to the arrest of a vehicle occupant); State v. Wanzek,
1999 ND 163,5 8,598 N.W.2d 811,813-14 (applying the Belton rule).
104. 497 N.W.2d 93 (1993).
105. Gilberts, 497 N.W.2d at 96-97.
106. Id. at 94.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 95.
109. Id.
110. Id.
Ill. Gilberts, 497 N.W.2d at 95.
112. Id.

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:377

box, the officer found a scale with white power residue, which Gilberts
admitted he had used to weigh cocaine.' 1 3
Gilberts was then arrested and charged with unlawful possession of
cocaine.11 4 He moved to suppress the cocaine, claiming the search of his
jacket was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."15 The North
Dakota Supreme Court held that the search of the vehicle incident to the
driver's arrest could not reasonably include Gilberts' jacket.116
In Gilberts, the court affirmed its adherence to Belton's bright-line rule,
acknowledging that the officer was authorized to search the passenger compartment of the car incident to the driver's arrest.ll 7 However, the court
also noted that Belton involved a slightly different factual scenario.118 In
Belton, all four occupants of the vehicle were arrested."19 In this case,
Gilberts was a non-arrested occupant in the car, and only the driver was
arrested.120 Based on this difference, the court determined that the Belton
search was limited as to Gilberts because of the "individualized nature of
the protections afforded to each person by the Fourth Amendment."121
In support of its reasoning, the court cited Ybarra v. Illinois,122 a case
in which officers searched all of the patrons in a bar while conducting a
search of the premises under a search warrant. 123 The officers found drugs
on Ybarra and arrested him.124 The United States Supreme Court ruled that
the pat down search of Ybarra was unreasonable because the officers did
not have any individualized suspicion to think that he was armed or
dangerous. 125

113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. The trial court denied Gilberts' suppression motion, and he entered a conditional
guilty plea. Id. at 94.
116. Id. at 97. The court resolved two other issues in the case on appeal. First, Gilberts
claimed that the officer had unreasonably ordered him to get out of the car in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 95. The Court rejected this argument, finding that the officer had the
right to request that Gilberts exit the car. Id. at 95-96. Second, the State argued that the search of
Gilberts' jacket was supported by probable cause to believe that Gilberts was involved in drug
activity and that the jacket would contain contraband. Id. at 96. The court disagreed and found
that the officer did not have any reason to think Gilberts was involved with drugs until after he
searched the jacket. Id. at 98-99.
117. Gilberts, 497 N.W.2d at 96.
118. Id. at 96-97.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
123. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 88-89.
124. Id. at 89.
125. Id. at 93.
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Following this rationale in Gilberts, the North Dakota Supreme Court
found it was significant that the officer knew the jacket belonged to
Gilberts, the non-arrested passenger, before he searched it.126 Under these
facts, the court determined that the Belton bright-line rule alone was not
enough to justify the intrusion into Gilberts' privacy, and therefore, the
search of Gilberts' jacket had to be independently supported by particularized probable cause or reasonable suspicion.127 Ultimately, the court
determined that the officer did not have sufficient suspicion to search
28
Gilberts' jacket, and his conviction was overturned.1
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice VandeWalle disagreed with the
majority's application of Ybarra to the facts of the case, arguing that it
unnecessarily blurred the bright-line rule of Belton.129 Under Belton, an
officer may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle and any containers therein incident to the lawful custodial arrest of a vehicle occupant.130 Belton's definition of a container includes clothing.'31 Therefore,
Chief Justice VandeWalle reasoned, Belton and Ybarra should be read
together to stand for the proposition that "the officer is entitled to search
any clothing in the automobile that is not actually being worn by the
passenger."1 32 However, the Chief Justice "reluctantly" concurred in the
result because the facts indicated that the officer had seen the jacket draped
around Gilberts before conducting the search. 133
C.

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES THE
PROPRIETY OF SEARCHING A NON-ARRESTED VEHICLE
OCCUPANT'S BELONGINGS

Six years after Gilberts in Wyoming v. Houghton,134 the United States

Supreme Court discussed whether law enforcement has the right to search a
non-arrested passenger's personal items while searching a vehicle during a
probable cause search.1 35 In that case, Houghton was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped for speeding.136 The officer approached the car in
order to speak with the driver, and during their conversation, he noticed a
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

State v. Gilberts, 497 N.W.2d 93, 97 (1993).
Id.
Id. at 99.
Id. (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring).
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
Id. at 461 n.4.
State v. Gilberts, 497 N.W.2d 93, 99 (1993) (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring).
Id.
526 U.S. 295 (1999).
Houghton, 526 U.S. at 302-03.
Id. at 297-98.
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syringe in the driver's front shirt pocket. 137 The driver admitted that he
used the syringe to inject drugs.138 The officers at the scene then removed
Houghton and the other passenger from the car and searched the car's
interior for any other illegal items. 139
One of the officers found a purse in the vehicle, and Houghton told him
that it belonged to her. 4 0 The officer searched the purse and found a small
brown pouch inside containing drug paraphernalia, a syringe, and methamphetamine.141 Houghton argued that this search was unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, and therefore, the drugs and drug paraphernalia should
be suppressed.142 The United States Supreme Court disagreed, finding that
Houghton's purse was properly within the scope of the officer's probable
cause search of the vehicle.143
The Court in Houghton began by acknowledging that there was clearly
probable cause for the officers to search the car based on the syringe found
on the driver and his admission that he had used it to take drugs.144 Turning
to whether the probable cause search should have extended to Houghton's
purse, the Court reasoned that an officer does not need particularized probable cause in order to search each separate container in a vehicle.145 Rather,
when an officer has probable cause to search the car, that is enough to
search any containers therein, even those of a passenger. "A passenger's
belongings, just like the driver's belongings or containers attached to the
car like a glove compartment, are 'in' the car." 146 The Houghton majority
reasoned that creating an exception to the probable cause search for
''passenger's property" would seriously impede law enforcement and lead

137. Id. at 298.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 298.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 299. The trial court denied Houghton's suppression motion, and she was convicted of felony possession of methamphetamine. Id. at 298-99. The Wyoming Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the officer should not have searched Houghton's purse because he knew it
belonged to her, and she was "not suspected of criminal activity." Houghton v. State, 956 P.2d
363, 372 (Wyo. 1998). Because there was no individualized probable cause to believe contraband
would be found in the purse, the search was unreasonable. Id. at 371-72.
143. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 302 (1999).
144. Id. at 300. This is known as the "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement,
which originated in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). If an officer has probable
cause to believe contraband will be found in a vehicle, she may search any part of the vehicle or
any containers within "that may conceal the object of the search." United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798, 825 (1982).
145. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 302.
146. Id.
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to a litany of cases contesting who actually owned the property searched. 147
Based on these principles, the Court held that the search of Houghton's
purse was reasonable, because it was in the car at the time of the probable
cause search and could have concealed other evidence of drug use. 148
In a concurring opinion, Justice Breyer noted the importance of the fact
that Houghton's purse was left in the car, rather than remaining on her person. 149 He viewed purses as "special containers" that are "repositories of
especially personal items that people generally like to keep with them at all
times." 15 0 Justice Breyer reasoned that if a woman's purse were somehow
attached to the person, it should be treated as "outer clothing" that would
require particularized probable cause to search.151 Because Houghton was
separated from her purse, it was properly searched as part of the probable
152
cause search of the vehicle.
D.

STATE COURTS CONSIDER WHETHER A NON-ARRESTED VEHICLE
OCCUPANT'S BELONGINGS MAY BE SEARCHED INCIDENT TO THE
ARREST OF A VEHICLE OCCUPANT

After the United States Supreme Court's decision in Houghton, several
state courts applied its principles regarding passenger's belongings in the
context of vehicle searches incident to arrest. 153 In State v. Lopez, 154 an
Arizona appellate court determined that even though Houghton involved a
probable cause search, its principles logically extended to searches incident
to the arrest of a vehicle occupant.155 Therefore, the court held that law
enforcement had the right to search all containers in the passenger
compartment of a vehicle, regardless of ownership, incident to the arrest of

147. Id. at 305.

See also LAFAVE, supra note 20, at Supp. 131 (agreeing that requiring

individualized probable cause for each container in a vehicle would hinder law enforcement
because "circumstances often will be very confusing as to what containers belong to what persons"). For the most part, however, LaFave is highly critical of the United States Supreme
Court's reasoning in Houghton. Id. at 130-31.
148. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 306-07.
149. Id. at 308 (Breyer, J., concurring).
150. Id.
151. Id.

152. Id. at 307-08.
153. See State v. Lopez, 10 P.3d 1207, 1211 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (citing to Houghton for
the principle that all containers in the passenger compartment may be searched incident to the
arrest of a vehicle occupant); State v. Ray, 620 N.W.2d 83, 89 (Neb. 2000) (finding Houghton
leads to the conclusion that a search incident to arrest includes all items in the passenger compartment, including those of a non-arrested occupant); State v. Steele, 2000 SD 78,
17, 613 N.W.2d
825, 829-30 (holding passenger's belongings in the car may be searched incident to arrest under
Houghton).

154. 10 P.3d 1207 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).
155. Lopez, 10 P.3d at 1211.
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a vehicle occupant.1 56 Likewise, in State v. Ray, 157 the Nebraska Supreme
Court applied the reasoning of Houghton in the case of a search incident to
arrest and upheld the search of a non-arrested occupant's backpack that had
been left in the passenger compartment of the vehicle.158 In reaching this
conclusion, the court reasoned that the scope of a vehicle search incident to
arrest includes all containers in the passenger compartment, even those containers belonging to a non-arrested occupant.159 The South Dakota Supreme Court also relied on Houghton in State v. Steele,160 and determined
that a non-arrested passenger's purse was properly searched incident to the
arrest of the driver because it was "in the car."1 6 1
While some state courts have relied heavily on Houghton in resolving
this issue, other state courts have looked at the importance of upholding the
Belton bright-line rule.162 A California appellate court in People v.
Mitchell163 held that law enforcement had the right to search a non-arrested
vehicle occupant's belongings during the search of the passenger compartment incident to arrest. 164 In its reasoning, the court noted that requiring
officers to ascertain the ownership of containers in the vehicle would "inject
confusion" into the Belton bright-line rule. 65 Similarly, the Colorado
Supreme Court in People v. McMillon166 relied on the Belton rationale in
determining that law enforcement properly searched a non-arrested vehicle
occupant's purse left in the passenger compartment.167 The court stated that
the arrest of a vehicle occupant "justifies the reasonable infringement on
any privacy interest that another passenger in the automobile may have in
that container." 168 Courts in Florida and Washington reached the same

156. Id.
157. 620 N.W.2d 83 (Neb. 2000).
158. Ray, 620 N.W.2d at 89.
159. Id.
160. 2000 SD 78,613 N.W.2d 825.
161. Steele, T 17,613 N.W.2d at 829-30.
162. See People v. Mitchell, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537, 539 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (finding Belton's
bright-line rule authorizes officer's search of a passenger's purse incident to the arrest of the
driver); People v. McMillon, 892 P.2d 879, 884 (Colo. 1995) (allowing a search of a passenger's
purse incident to the arrest of another person in the vehicle under Belton); State v. Moore, 619 So.
2d 376, 377 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that an officer could search a passenger's purse
incident to arrest of driver under Belton); State v. Parker, 944 P.2d 1081, 1084-85 (Wash. Ct. App.
1997) (allowing a search of non-arrested passenger's purse incident to arrest of the driver based on
Belton).
163. 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
164. Mitchell, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 538.
165. Id. at 540.
166. 892 P.2d 879 (Colo. 1995).
167. McMillon, 892 P.2d at 884.
168. Id.

2005]

CASE COMMENT

conclusion regarding passenger's property based on the importance of
retaining the Belton bright-line rule, and upheld the search of a non-arrested
passenger's purse that had been left in the passenger compartment of the
vehicle. 169
E.

SUMMARY OF LEGAL BACKGROUND

Prior to 1969, the United States Supreme Court's search incident to
arrest jurisprudence was inconsistent and unpredictable.170 However, in
Chimel, the Court formulated a new standard, holding that the scope of a
search incident to arrest could extend to a search of the "arrestee's person
and the area 'within his immediate control.""171 Unsatisfied with the
application of Chimel in the specific context of vehicle searches, the Court
in Belton announced a bright-line rule for vehicle searches incident to
arrest 72 When a vehicle occupant has been arrested, an officer may search
the passenger compartment of the vehicle and any containers found
therein. 173

Although the North Dakota Supreme Court generally followed Belton,
it determined in Gilberts that Belton's principles did not apply to the
belongings of a non-arrested vehicle occupant.' 74 Rather, the court found
that particularized probable cause or reasonable suspicion was necessary to
search an item that officers knew belonged to a non-arrested person, even if
it had been left in the vehicle. 175 Six years after Gilberts, the United States
Supreme Court in Houghton held that officers conducting a probable cause
search of a vehicle could search a non-arrested passenger's belongings that
were left in the vehicle. 176 Several state courts found the Houghton rationale applicable to vehicle searches incident to arrest, and held that law
enforcement may search the property of a non-arrested person during a
search of the passenger compartment incident to the arrest of a vehicle
77
occupant. 1
169. State v. Moore, 619 So. 2d 376, 377 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Parker, 944
P.2d 1081, 1084-85 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
170. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755 (1969).
171. Id. at 763.
172. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,459-60 (1981).
173. Id. at 460-61.
174. State v. Gilberts, 497 N.W.2d 93, 96-97 (1993).
175. Id. at 97-98.
176. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 302 (1999).
177. See State v. Lopez, 10 P.3d 1207, 1211 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (applying Houghton in the
case of a search incident to arrest); State v. Ray, 620 N.W.2d 83, 89 (Neb. 2000) (relying on
Houghton to determine that a non-arrested vehicle occupants belongings may be searched); State
v. Steele, 2000 SD 78, 5 17, 613 N.W.2d 825, 829-30 (applying Houghton to search incident to
arrest).
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ANALYSIS

The North Dakota Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in
Tognotti with Justice Maring writing for the court. 178 Ten years after
Gilberts, the'Tognotti court reconsidered whether Belton's bright-line rule
allows an officer to search any items in the passenger compartment of a
vehicle incident to the arrest of a vehicle occupant, even if they belong to a
non-arrested occupant.1 79 In its reasoning, the court relied heavily on the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Wyoming v. Houghton and the
decisions of other state courts.18 0 Ultimately, the Court overruled Gilberts
in favor of a more categorical approach to the search of containers in a
vehicle incident to the arrest of a vehicle occupant.181
A.

REAFFIRMANCE OF BELTON'S VITALITY IN NORTH DAKOTA

The Tognotti court began by reaffirming its adherence to the Belton
bright-line rule for determining the scope of vehicle searches incident to the
lawful custodial arrest of an occupant. 8 2 The court emphasized the twin
purposes of Belton, namely, to create a workable rule for law enforcement
in vehicle searches and to eliminate the need for courts to assess reasonableness on an ad hoc basis.18 3 In light of the need for a clear standard
governing the scope of vehicle searches, the court reasoned that its decision
in Gilberts, which required officers to determine the ownership of containers in a vehicle before allowing a search, "unnecessarily dim[med] the
4
bright-line as announced by Belton."18

B.

NEED FOR A BRIGHT-LINE RULE REINFORCED IN HOUGHTON

In further support of the proposition that a bright-line rule is necessary
for vehicle searches, the court cited the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Houghton.185 Although Houghton involved a warrantless search
supported by probable cause under the "automobile exception" rather than a
search incident to a custodial arrest, the court still found its principles helpful in resolving the issue before it in Tognotti.18 6 The court quoted with
approval passages from Houghton regarding the difficulty that law
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

State v. Tognotti, 2003 ND 99, 5 1, 663 N.W.2d 642, 643.
Id. 5 6, 663 N.W.2d at 644.
Id., 55 11-13, 663 N.W.2d at 646-48.
Id. 5 11,663 N.W.2d at 646.
Id. 5 10.
Id. (citing State v. Wanzek, 1999 ND 163, T 15, 598 N.W.2d 811, 815).
Tognotti, 5 11,663 N.W.2d at 646.
Id. at 646-47.
Id.

20051

CASE COMMENT

enforcement and the courts would encounter if there were a special
exception for passenger's property in vehicle searches. 187 Following the
reasoning of Houghton, the court anticipated that officers would be forced
to make determinations of ownership before searching containers in a vehicle, and criminal defendants would later contest these determinations in
lawsuits.1 88 Ultimately, the court found that a special rule "based upon
ownership of containers or other articles inside the vehicle" was
inconsistent with the bright-line approach necessary for effective law
enforcement. 189
C.

NEED FOR A BRIGHT-LINE RULE REAFFIRMED IN STATE COURT
DECISIONS

In addition to drawing from the principles of Houghton, the court
reviewed how other state courts had decided the issue in the time following
Gilberts.190 The court observed that a number of state courts, including
California, Colorado, Florida, and Washington, had already decided prior to
Houghton that the Belton bright-line rule allows officers to search containers belonging to a non-arrested vehicle occupant that are found in the
passenger compartment. 9 1 Furthermore, the court noted that several more
recent state court decisions, including Arizona, Nebraska, and South
Dakota, had relied on the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in
Houghton to determine that the permissible scope of a vehicle search incident to arrest includes a non-arrested vehicle occupant's containers in the
passenger compartment. 92 The Tognotti court stated that it found the
reasoning of these state court decisions to be "persuasive," and then
announced its holding: "[Aln arresting officer's search of a purse belonging
to a nonarrested occupant which is voluntarily left in the vehicle is a valid
93
search incident to the arrest of a passenger in the vehicle."1

187. Id. at 647 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 305-06 (1999)).
188. Id.

189. Id. at 646.
190. Id.
11-13, 663 N.W.2d at 647-48.
191. Id. l 13, 663 N.W.2d at 648 (citing People v. Mitchell, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537, 539 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1995); People v. McMillon, 892 P.2d 879, 884 (Colo. 1995); State v. Moore, 619 So. 2d
376, 377 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Parker, 944 P.2d 1081, 1084 1085 (Wash. Ct. App.
1997)).
192. Id. 5 11,663 N.W.2d at 647 (citing State v. Lopez, 10 P.3d 1207, 1211 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2000); State v. Ray, 620 N.W.2d 83, 89 (Neb. 2000); State v. Steele, 2000 SD 78, 5 17, 613
N.W.2d 825, 829-30).
193. Id. 55 13-14, 663 N.W.2d at 648.
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LIMITATIONS ON THE BRIGHT-LINE RULE AS TO NON-ARRESTED
VEHICLE OCCUPANTS

Having clearly affirmed its adherence to a bright-line rule for vehicle
searches, the court was careful to indicate the limitations of its holding as
well.194 First, the court noted that the Belton bright-line allows a search of
the passenger compartment of the vehicle and any containers therein incident to arrest, but it does not allow the search of a non-arrested occupant's
person.195 Rather, the court stated that particularized probable cause or
reasonable suspicion is still required to conduct a search or pat down of a
non-arrested person. 96
Second, when an item is something as personal as the non-arrested
occupant's purse or billfold, the court reasoned that law enforcement cannot
force the non-arrested occupant to leave it in the vehicle.197 In reaching this
conclusion, the court looked first to Justice Breyer's concurrence in
Houghton, which expressed the idea that purses are "special containers"
that should receive special protection if attached to the person.198 The court
also cited to state courts in Idaho, Kansas, and Washington in support of the
proposition that an officer violates the Fourth Amendment by ordering a
non-arrested passenger to leave her purse in the car, so that it can be
searched incident to arrest.1 99 In its survey of relevant state court decisions,

the court observed that only South Dakota has held that an officer may
force a non-arrested occupant to leave her purse in the vehicle and then
search it incident to the arrest of another occupant. 200 After considering the
cases imposing this special limitation for personal items like purses, the
court determined that "the Fourth Amendment is violated when an officer
directs that a purse be left in the vehicle and then proceeds to search the
purse incident to the arrest of another passenger." 201

194. Id. 55 16-17, 663 N.W.2d at 648-49.
195. Id. I 16, 663 N.W.2d at 648.
196. Id. at 648-49.
197. Id. $ 20, 663 N.W.2d at 650.
198. Id. 17, 663 N.W.2d at 649 (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 308 (1999)
(Breyer, J., concurring)).
199. Id. T 17, 663 N.W.2d at 649 (citing State v. Newsom, 979 P.2d 100, 102 (Idaho 1998);
State v. Boyd, 64 P.3d 419, 427 (Kan. 2003); State v. Seitz, 941 P.2d 5, 8 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
200. Id. 17, 663 N.W.2d at 649 (citing State v. Steele, 2000 SD 78, 19, 613 N.W.2d 825,
830).
201. Id. 20,663 N.W.2d at 650.
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TOGNOTTI's HOLDING

Ultimately, the court held that an officer has the right, incident to the
lawful arrest of a vehicle occupant, to search a non-arrested occupant's
purse that is voluntarily left in the passenger compartment. 202 However, in
order to protect citizens from abuse of discretion by police officers, the
court also held that an officer violates the Fourth Amendment if he directs a
non-arrested occupant to leave her purse in the vehicle and then searches
the purse incident to arrest. 203 Finally, the court expressly overruled its
decision in Gilberts to the extent that its rationale is contrary to Tognotti.204
Turning to the facts of the case before it, the court determined that
there was not sufficient evidence in the record to make a finding regarding
whether Tognotti voluntarily left her purse in the car or whether Officer
Wahl had directed her to do S0.205 The court therefore reversed the suppres-

sion order and remanded for a limited evidentiary hearing to determine this
dispositive factual issue. 206
IV. IMPACT
Perhaps the most obvious impact of Tognotti was that it brought North
Dakota in line with a growing number of decisions reinforcing the Belton
bright-line and allowing an officer to search any containers in the passenger
compartment of a vehicle incident to arrest of an occupant, regardless of
207

ownership.
However, the question remains whether Tognotti does in fact create a

bright-line rule that is easy for law enforcement to apply when searching
202. id. 5 14, 663 N.W.2d at 648.
203. Id. 20,663 N.W.2d at 650.
204. Id. 5 1,663 N.W.2d at 643.
205. Id. 5 22, 663 N.W.2d at 650.
206. Id. 123.
207. See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 10 P.3d 1207, 1211 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (reasoning that
Houghton's principles can be applied to determine that all containers in the passenger compartment may be searched incident to arrest of a vehicle occupant); People v. Mitchell, 42 Cal. Rptr.
2d 537, 540 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (finding the Belton bright-line rule authorizes an officer's search
of a passenger's purse incident to the arrest of the driver); People v. McMillon, 892 P.2d 879, 884
(Colo. 1995) (allowing a search of a passenger's purse incident to the arrest of another person in
the vehicle under Belton); State v. Moore, 619 So. 2d 376, 377 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding
that the officer could search a passenger's purse incident to the arrest of the driver under Belton);
State v. Ray, 620 N.W.2d 83, 89 (Neb. 2000) (finding that Houghton leads to the conclusion that a
search incident to arrest includes all items in a passenger compartment, even those of a nonarrested occupant); State v. Steele, 2000 SD 78, 5 17, 613 N.W.2d 825, 829-30 (holding that the
passenger's belongings in the car may be searched incident to arrest under Houghton); State v.
Parker, 944 P.2d 1081, 1085 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (allowing a search of a non-arrested passenger's purse incident to the arrest of the driver based on Belton); State v. Matejka, 2001 WI 5, 43,
621 N.W.2d 891, 899 (allowing a warrantless search of a passenger's jacket based on the driver's
consent to search the vehicle based on principles of Houghton).
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vehicles incident to arrest. 208 Although the principles of Tognotti seem
straightforward at first blush, there are some ambiguities. Much of the
Court's reasoning focused on the special nature of a purse and the fact that
"it logically carries, for its owner a heightened expectation of privacy, much
like the clothing the person is wearing." 209 What the court does not make
clear is whether this voluntariness requirement extends to any belongings of
a non-arrested vehicle occupant other than a purse or billfold.210
Perhaps the non-arrested person does not use a purse, but instead
carries a backpack. Would the non-arrested person then be entitled to take
the backpack out of the vehicle with her, thus preventing the officer from
searching it? Would the answer hinge on whether the person keeps in the
backpack the same type of things that would normally be found in a purse,
such as a driver's license, credit cards, and car keys? Tognotti does not
answer these questions. Presumably, a defendant in the future will be able
to contest these issues, claiming a heightened expectation of privacy in
items that may be analogous to a purse in order to extend the scope of the
voluntariness requirement.
Since Tognotti was decided in June 2003, the North Dakota Supreme
Court has cited it several times in other opinions, but not for its major
search incident to arrest principles. 211 An Illinois appellate decision has
since cited Tognotti with approval, agreeing with North Dakota's reliance
on Houghton for the principle that law enforcement officers do not have to
determine the ownership of the containers in a passenger compartment be2 12
fore searching them incident to the arrest of a vehicle occupant.
V. CONCLUSION
In Tognotti, the North Dakota Supreme Court overruled the principles
of its previous decision State v. Gilberts regarding the search of a non-

208. See State v. Tognotti, 2003 ND 99,
11, 663 N.W.2d 642, 646-47 (explaining that
maintenance of a "clear and workable rule for police searches" is one of the primary justifications
for a bright-line rule regarding vehicle searches incident to arrest).
209. Id. 5 20, 663 N.W.2d at 650.
210. Id.
211. See State v. Parizek, 2004 ND 78, T 14, 678 N.W.2d 154, 160 (citing Tognotti for the
proposition that an officer must have reasonable suspicion to conduct a pat down frisk of a nonarrested person); State v. Guscette, 2004 ND 71, 1 5, 678 N.W.2d 126, 128 (citing Tognotti for the
appellate standard of review on a motion to suppress); State v. Bollingberg, 2004 ND 30, 5 13,
674 N.W.2d 281, 284 (same); State v. Waltz, 2003 ND 197, T 8, 672 N.W.2d 457, 460 (citing
Tognotti for the proposition that a warrantless search is invalid unless it falls within an exception
to the warrant requirement).
212. See People v. Morales, 799 N.E.2d 986, 992-93 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (reaching the same
decision as Tognotti on similar facts, as defendant was a non-arrested passenger who left his
jacket in the vehicle).
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arrested vehicle occupant's belongings incident to the arrest of another
person in the vehicle. 2 13 The court held that an officer has the right to
search a non-arrested occupant's purse incident to the arrest of another person in the vehicle, provided that the purse was in the vehicle at the time of
the arrest, and the non-arrested occupant left it in the passenger compartment voluntarily.214 However, the court also held that an officer violates
the Fourth Amendment if he orders a non-arrested occupant to leave her
purse in the vehicle so he can search it incident to arrest.2 15
Kirsten M. Sjue

213. Tognotti, $ 1, 663 N.W.2d at 643.
214. Id.
215. Id. 5 20, 663 N.W.2d at 650.

